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NO. 25 JUNE 2018 Introduction 
Qualified Majority Voting and Flexible 
Integration for a More Effective CFSP? 
A Critical Examination of the EU’s Options 
Annegret Bendiek, Ronja Kempin and Nicolai von Ondarza 
The idea of qualified majority voting in the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) is not new, but its momentum has been boosted by the growing international 
challenges facing the EU. The German government argues that abolishing the una-
nimity principle would make the EU a stronger foreign policy actor in face of rising 
transatlantic tensions, a resurgent Russia and an expansive China. But short of an 
overall treaty amendment the legal possibilities are limited. Qualified majority voting 
in the CFSP is also problematic if it weakens the EU’s internal legitimacy and external 
credibility. A dual approach is necessary: in the medium term strengthening the CFSP 
through flexible integration; in the long term supporting the development of a shared 
strategic culture through the establishment of collective European threat analysis 
and intelligence. 
 
In view of the rapid changes in the EU’s 
immediate geographical and geopolitical 
landscape the idea of introducing qualified 
majority voting in the CFSP has reappeared 
on the agenda at the highest political levels. 
At the Munich Security Conference in Feb-
ruary 2018 for example, German Defence 
Minister Ursula von der Leyen called for 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 
to be expanded to the CFSP. In the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) this 
format permits Member States “whose mili-
tary capabilities fulfil higher criteria and 
which have made more binding commit-
ments to one another in this area with a 
view to the most demanding missions” to 
“establish permanent structured coopera-
tion within the Union framework” (Article 
42 (6) TEU). Munich Security Conference 
Chairman Wolfgang Ischinger goes further, 
arguing for qualified majority voting in the 
CFSP – as does Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker, who is convinced that this 
would make the Union more “weltpolitik-
faehig” (a neologism meaning “capable 
of world politics”). Most recently, German 
Chancellor Merkel and French President 
Macron called for the “exploration” of the 
use of qualified majority in CFSP in their 
Meseberg declaration of June 2018. 
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The CFSP’s Deficits 
These statements reflect the wish to im-
prove the EU’s effectiveness in responding 
rapidly and credibly to external develop-
ments. As things stand at present, the EU 
rarely succeeds in responding decisively to 
international challenges. Rapid, concerted 
action, as in the case of the poisoning of 
former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal 
tends to be the exception. Normally the EU 
requires time to agree on a minimum con-
sensus, and is often unable to agree on a 
joint position at all. As a collective actor, 
the EU is absent from Syria, while today 
even China is capable of playing “divide 
and rule” with its member states. In its 
volatile southern neighbourhood EU mem-
ber states are unable to agree on a compre-
hensive and consistent migration policy. 
The biggest obstacle to the CFSP remains 
the member states’ unwillingness to nego-
tiate viable compromises and to permit 
the CFSP and the High Representative to en-
croach on national prerogatives. A number 
of successes have been achieved through 
minilateral initiatives whereby a small 
number of countries address foreign policy 
challenges on behalf of the EU, with ex-
amples including the EU-3 and the Nor-
mandy formats. As long as such groups 
do not divide the Union into blocks with 
different interests, these formats can serve 
as catalysts for improving the EU’s foreign 
policy and security capacity to act. Govern-
ments have been quick to approve an in-
formal division of labour between the Euro-
pean External Action Service (EEAS) and 
the member states, for instance when the 
United Kingdom and Germany launched 
an initiative on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
November 2014, which the EEAS and the 
Commission took up just a month later. 
As matters presently stand, CFSP deci-
sions are with few exceptions taken un-
animously by the Council; the European 
Parliament has no co-decision power. 
Legally speaking, CFSP decisions concern 
either general EU guidelines (such as 
implementation of the 2016 European 
Global Strategy) or defining common 
positions and actions (such as sanctions and 
military and civilian CSDP operations). 
Potential for Qualified Majority 
Voting in the CFSP 
As a glance at the practice reveals, there 
would be both pros and cons to qualified 
majority voting in the CFSP. Every major 
alteration to the EU treaties has seen suc-
cessive expansion of the scope of qualified 
majority voting, to a point where it now 
covers almost all policy areas. Yet the pro-
cedure has rarely been employed to outvote 
member states. Instead, even in cases where 
a qualified majority in the Council would 
suffice, 80 percent of decisions are ulti-
mately taken in consensus. In 2016 it was 
more than 90 percent, despite the EU’s 
widely discussed north/south and east/west 
divisions. Majority voting functions best 
where it is employed to persuade member 
states to negotiate compromises they would 
have rejected had they been able to veto. 
This practice has worked well for harmoni-
zation in the internal market, as well as in 
justice and home affairs. 
Cases where several member states are 
outvoted tend to reflect a failure of nego-
tiations in the Council. In recent years there 
have been only a handful of occurrences 
where three or more member states have 
been forced to accept a majority vote, in 
2016 just one. The 2015 decision on refugee 
quotas within the EU illustrates very well 
how compliance with EU law can be under-
mined if majority voting is used to override 
the fundamental national interests of 
member states. In this case four central and 
eastern European countries were outvoted. 
The decision is legally binding, and an 
appeal to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) was rejected. The European Commis-
sion can seek to impose sanctions against 
the governments in question via the ECJ, 
but cannot force them to accept refugees 
against their will. 
Because of similar sensitivities over na-
tional sovereignty, the CFSP/CSDP is expli-
citly excluded from majority voting; even 
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after the Treaty of Lisbon this remains an 
intergovernmental policy field. With only 
a few exceptions the member states still 
make decisions on CFSP matters through 
unanimous voting in the Council (Article 
31 (2) TEU). 
Since the member states exercise de facto 
executive power in the CFSP, a passage to 
the effect that it must not “prejudice the 
specific character of the security and de-
fence policy” of member states was inserted 
in Article 42 (2) TEU during the drafting 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. This ensures that 
member states are able to exercise reserva-
tions of national constitutional prerogatives 
and competencies, for example concerning 
mutual defence under Article 42 (7). Germa-
ny for instance would be entitled to cite its 
requirement of parliamentary approval for 
military deployment, Austria its military 
neutrality. 
In view of such considerations the intro-
duction of qualified majority voting in 
the CFSP as a general decision-making pro-
cedure appears less than plausible, even 
if the Commission President as well as Ger-
many and France have now called for it on 
several occasions. Under Article 48 TEU a 
change from unanimity to qualified major-
ity voting would certainly require an ordi-
nary treaty revision procedure, including a 
Convention, approval by member states 
and national ratification with national 
referendums as required (see SWP Com-
ment 50/2015). Political qualms are joined 
by constitutional reservations, as the 
German Federal Constitutional Court laid 
out in its Lisbon ruling: a balance must be 
maintained between integration and demo-
cratic oversight. The decision to use mili-
tary force was one of the cases the Consti-
tutional Court classified as an exclusively 
national prerogative. In other words, even 
if a general introduction of qualified major-
ity voting in the CFSP was desired, this 
would still face significant political and 
legal obstacles. 
Legal Framework 
A number of possibilities nevertheless 
exist for using qualified majority voting in 
the CFSP without changing the existing EU 
treaties. 
Exceptions 
Firstly, under Article 31 (2) TEU the Council 
may in clearly defined circumstances make 
decisions by qualified majority. These are 
the appointment of EU Special Representa-
tives and implementing decisions deriving 
from unanimous decisions of the European 
Council. Given that the latter themselves 
require political consensus, little use is 
likely to be made of this possibility in prac-
tice. The appointment of an EU Special Rep-
resentative for the Sahel is the only case to 
date where a majority vote was taken in the 
CFSP. 
Passerelle Clause 
Secondly, qualified majority voting in the 
CFSP could be introduced by means of a 
simplified revision procedure under Article 
48 (7) TEU. This so-called passerelle clause 
provides that the European Council may 
decide unanimously to permit qualified 
majority voting in specific policy fields 
where decisions would otherwise have to 
be made unanimously. In order to be able 
to use this provision some member states 
would have to meet national constitutional 
requirements; the German government, 
for example, would first have to obtain the 
approval of the Bundestag. For such reasons 
the passerelle clause has hitherto been used 
neither in the CFSP nor in other policy 
fields. But given the necessary political will, 
the EU could in this way – at least within 
certain limits – introduce majority voting 
in the CFSP without wholesale alterations 
to the EU Treaty. Decisions of military or 
defence relevance are excluded, and in the 
CFSP the passerelle clause applies only to 
the Council; giving the European Parlia-
ment decision-making powers in the CFSP 
outside of its current, very limited compe-
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tences in this area would require a com-
prehensive treaty revision. 
Constructive Abstention 
The third possibility for instituting majority 
voting in the CFSP is constructive absten-
tion under Article 23 (1) TEU. A member 
state may choose to refrain from using its 
veto in order to enable a CFSP decision. 
That state is then exempt from funding and 
implementing the decision. Theoretically, 
member states of the EU could decide to 
use constructive abstention in the CFSP as 
a general rule, reserving the veto solely to 
the cases of imperative national interest. 
Current practice tells a different story, 
however. Since constructive abstention was 
introduced in the Treaty of Nice it has been 
used only once, by Cyprus in the vote on EU 
Operation EULEX in Kosovo. 
Flexible Integration in the CFSP 
The EU’s ability to act could also be en-
hanced through flexible integration. What 
this means is collective action by those 
member states that are willing and able 
to do so. “Multi-speed Europe” has been a 
reality since the first opt-outs to the Maas-
tricht Treaty and the Schengen Agreement, 
and since the European debt crisis almost 
all the EU’s decisive integration steps have 
been taken by specific groups of member 
states, especially concerning the Eurozone. 
Flexible integration is especially effective 
where it is tied to EU institutions and pro-
vides benefits for the participating member 
states. Acting as pioneers, they can create 
incentives for other EU states to successively 
come on board. However this model, in 
which all the others are supposed to follow 
an avant-garde has to date only fully suc-
cessful in the case of the EU Social Charter. 
The Eurozone and the Schengen Area have 
both successively been integrated into the 
treaty structure and expanded, but even 
today do not include all the EU states. 
For the CFSP/CSDP there would be several 
possibilities for flexible integration within 
the scope of the EU treaties. 
Enhanced Cooperation 
Firstly, the general instrument of enhanced 
cooperation could be used in the CFSP/ 
tCSDP. Provided that at least nine member 
states join together to initiate a joint proj-
ect, they may make use of the EU’s pro-
cedures, bodies and instruments. But in 
the CFSP – unlike in other policy areas – 
enhanced cooperation requires a unani-
mous decision in the Council (Article 329 
(2) TEU). As a result, it can be stopped by 
the veto of a single member state and has 
turned out to be a blunt sword. While this 
mode of cooperation has been realised four 
times altogether in other policy areas (with 
Germany participating in all four cases), it 
has not to date been applied in the CFSP. 
Permanent Structured Cooperation 
The second significant option is the (only 
semantically similar) Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) in the CSDP. PESCO 
allows a group of member states “whose 
military capabilities fulfil higher criteria” 
(Article 42 (6) TEU) to pursue collective pro-
curement and capability development. 
The purpose is above all to strengthen joint 
military capabilities, whereas decisions 
about EU operations still have to be made 
unanimously. 
PESCO is the most interesting instrument 
of legal differentiation and the only one 
in the legal domain of CFSP/CSDP that has 
already been used in practice. On 11 De-
cember 2017 twenty-five member states 
established a Permanent Structured Co-
operation; absent were only the United 
Kingdom (which is set to leave the EU in 
2019), Denmark (which has opted out of 
the military aspects of the CSDP altogether), 
and Malta. In this sense the German per-
spective has prevailed over the French: 
Berlin wanted to make PESCO as inclusive 
as possible while Paris envisaged a small, 
ambitious leading group. Time will tell 
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whether an inclusive differentiation with 
twenty-five states in seventeen projects is 
suited to provide adequate incentives for 
the participating states to engage in more 
ambitious collective action in the CSDP – 
and how it will relate with the “European 
Intervention Initiative” launched by French 
President Macron outside of the EU frame-
work. 
Flexible Implementation of 
CFSP/CSDP Decisions 
The third formal flexibilisation instrument 
in the CSDP is entrusting a group of mem-
ber states with a military operation under 
Article 44 TEU. Although this option has 
not yet been used in the formal sense, it is 
obvious that the EU’s civilian and military 
operations have always comprised coali-
tions of member states supplying civilian 
personnel and/or troops. This is where 
flexibilisation appears at first glance to 
function best. The fundamental decisions 
– whether to deploy an EU operation and 
what objectives it is to pursue – are taken 
unanimously in the Council, and are ex-
ecuted by the willing and able. But this 
arrangement has its pitfalls, as burden-
sharing in the CSDP is less than ideal. After 
a mandate has been adopted, member 
states’ contributions are often inadequate. 
Despite unanimous decisions the EU regu-
larly experiences shortfalls when recruiting 
military and/or civilian personnel for its 
operations. 
Coalitions of the Willing 
Given that the obstacles to flexible integra-
tion in the context of CFSP and CSDP are so 
high, EU states have a track record of pur-
suing European foreign and security policy 
through coalitions of the willing within and 
outside formal EU processes. Large member 
states with political weight are thus able to 
contribute substantially to the resolution of 
conflicts. Crisis management in the Balkans, 
the initiative for the Kosovo-Serbia Dia-
logue, the EU-3+3 talks with Iran about its 
nuclear programme and the Minsk Agree-
ment in the so-called Normandy format all 
arose through groups established outside 
the formal CFSP channels. The same also 
applies to informal global formats like the 
G-7 and G-20, which play an important role 
in setting the EU’s foreign policy and secu-
rity agenda. Four EU member states belong 
to the G-7 and G-20 – namely Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom and Italy – 
while the EU itself enjoys observer status. 
Even if they operate outside the CFSP 
framework, coalitions of the willing have 
become established practice in European 
foreign policy. Thus the High Representa-
tive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Federica Mogherini, has accepted this model, 
as long as the actions of the group of states 
serve treaty objectives and she and the other 
member states are fully informed. 
Coalitions of the willing can also be 
expanded to states outside the Union and 
formalised through partnership agreements 
and ad-hoc arrangements in order to imple-
ment the EU foreign policy. European coun-
tries that cooperate with “willing” EU states 
include Switzerland, Norway and the (post-
Brexit) United Kingdom, along with the 
United States and Canada. The EU also regu-
larly invites third states to join EU sanctions 
and declarations by the High Representative 
(alignment). The Skripal crisis demonstrated 
the way in which a firm joint statement 
by all member states in conjunction with 
a coalition of willing EU and non-EU states 
can enhance the impact of the EU and its 
member states. But this concept has limits, 
for example if member states press ahead 
with the establishment of foreign policy 
and security instruments solely in order to 
bypass regular EU procedures. French Presi-
dent Emmanuel Macron’s so-called Euro-
pean Intervention Initiative, for example, 
appears to expand coalitions of the willing 
beyond the EU framework, and is explicitly 
open to the UK post Brexit. 
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Political Conditions for 
Qualified Majority Voting and 
Flexible Integration in the CFSP 
As laid out above there are, legally speak-
ing, possibilities exist both to introduce 
qualified majority voting in the CFSP and 
to further flexibilise the EU’s foreign and 
security policy. But that discussion cannot 
be conducted in isolation from the question 
of the CFSP’s overall strategic objectives. 
The EU sees itself as a force for peace, its 
foreign policy without geographical restric-
tions but guided by “democracy, the rule 
of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
and other core principles (Article 21 (1) TEU). 
The EU’s general (Article 3 (5) TEU) and 
foreign policy specific (Article 21 (2) TEU) 
objectives are correspondingly ambitious. 
Germany’s March 2018 coalition agreement 
between CDU, CSU and SPD also cites the 
EU as a force for peace (“Friedensmacht”). 
The essence of a “force for peace” narrative 
is that the EU’s foreign and security policy 
is built on shared values, demonstrates 
internal legitimacy (parliamentary control) 
and generates external credibility. If ex-
panded flexible integration and increasing 
use of qualified majority voting in the CFSP 
are to remain tied to those objectives, three 
conditions would have to be fulfilled: 
Common Strategic Culture 
The first condition for expanded use of 
qualified majority voting is a collective 
sense of purpose and community. In for-
eign and security policy this belief is rooted 
in shared interests and a common strategic 
culture. The member states would need to 
support the fundamental direction of a 
collective foreign and security policy to the 
extent that they accepted being outvoted on 
individual questions. Germany also needs 
to clarify the extent to which it would be 
willing to bow to a majority vote for the 
sake of strengthening the EU’s foreign policy 
and security response. With the European 
Global Strategy of 2016 the EU member 
states have established a shared paradigm 
for foreign and security policy. Here the 
idea of a force for peace is closely tied to 
the strengthening of resilience, in the sense 
of protecting the EU acquis communautaire 
against external dangers and threats and 
preserving the multilateral order. 
Although the EU possesses its own Euro-
pean External Action Service (EEAS), which 
supports the work of the High Representa-
tive, the member states are still a long way 
from a shared strategic culture with global 
reach that extends beyond the wider neigh-
bourhood. The difficulty of finding con-
sensus in the scope of the EU-27 is reflected 
in the recurring discussions about issues 
such as sanctions against Russia, the atti-
tude to adopt vis-à-vis Israel and the exter-
nal energy policy. 
Internal Legitimacy 
The second condition for expanding majority 
voting in the CFSP is the preservation of in-
ternal legitimacy. The EU’s democratic defi-
cits are well known and much discussed. 
Decisions in the CFSP – up to and includ-
ing far-reaching sanctions decisions in the 
Council and the deployment of armed 
forces – derive their legitimacy from the 
veto available to all the governments, which 
are in turn answerable to their respective 
parliaments. Critics point out that this 
chain of legitimacy would be broken if 
individual governments could be outvoted. 
In other areas of the EU the loss of legiti-
macy associated with majority voting in the 
Council is compensated by the co-decision 
of the European Parliament (Community 
method). Some European legal experts 
therefore argue that qualified majority 
voting in the Council should be introduced 
for the CFSP, with the European Parliament 
receiving co-decision power in the spirit of 
the Community method. Security experts 
often counter that even in the national 
framework foreign and security policy is 
the preserve of the executive, and argue 
that the same principle should also apply to 
the CFSP. Therefore, they say, the Commu-
nity method cannot simply be applied lock, 
stock and barrel to the CFSP. 
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If qualified majority voting were to be 
introduced, stronger control by the Euro-
pean Parliament should certainly follow 
to secure the legitimacy of the CFSP. The 
European Parliament would need to be 
given oversight over mandates and closer 
communication with the High Represen-
tative, while the Inter-parliamentary Con-
ference for the CFSP and the CSDP would 
need to be strongly reinforced. 
Inclusion of all member states would 
also ensure greater internal legitimacy. The 
requirements for a qualified majority in 
the Council (55 percent of member states 
representing 65 percent of the EU’s popu-
lation) grant great weight to the large 
member states. This makes it politically 
easier to outvote a small EU state than for 
example France or Germany. Smaller mem-
ber states are therefore likely to watch 
especially carefully how their interests in 
the CFSP would be protected after the intro-
duction of majority voting. 
External Credibility 
The third challenge for qualified majority 
voting in the CFSP is how to ensure external 
credibility. Internally, an EU member state 
is required to implement legislation even 
if it originally rejected the legal act. If it 
refuses or fails to do so, the Commission – 
in its role as guardian of the Treaties – can 
take robust measures to ensure compliance. 
It can initiate infringement proceedings 
and impose sanctions in conjunction with 
the ECJ. The CFSP has no such arrangement. 
With a few exceptions it is formally outside 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ, even if the 
latter plays a growing role in shaping the 
CFSP’s application according to the treaty 
provisions and fundamental rights, espe-
cially over sanctions decisions. 
Additionally, speaking with one voice 
represents one of the most important 
resources of the EU’s foreign and security 
policy. To date, the largest states – France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom – 
have often set the agenda. But if member 
states were being very publicly outvoted on 
crucial decisions such as the future policy 
towards the United States, Russia and China, 
the EU’s credibility as a collective external 
policy actor would suffer. And this could 
encourage external actors to seek to “divide 
and rule” by driving additional wedges into 
the Union. 
In order to safeguard its external credi-
bility the EU should therefore rely prin-
cipally on two legal instruments. The first 
would be constructive abstention, whereby 
a member state deliberately refrains from 
preventing an EU decision. The second 
would be to define areas where member 
states unanimously agree on the strategic 
direction of the CFSP but leave the concrete 
implementation of policies to either quali-
fied majority voting or, when it comes to 
CSDP missions or operations, to coalitions 
of the willing. 
Conclusions 
Despite the legal possibilities, the political 
conditions for introducing qualified majority 
voting in the CFSP remain highly contro-
versial. To date Germany has followed two 
different strategies to pursue its interests. 
On the question of establishing collective 
capabilities Germany gave precedence to 
inclusive formats involving the largest pos-
sible number of member states, like Battle-
groups and PESCO, while for crisis response 
it preferred small groups of large member 
states like the EU-3 and the Normandy 
format. After the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom from the EU in 2019 even greater 
institutional flexibility will be required if 
London is to be included in discussions on 
European security. 
In this vein, France and Germany pro-
posed in June 2018 the creation of a “Euro-
pean Security Council” in order to improve 
decision-making in the CFSP. For now, 
details are scarce: for instance whether such 
a Security Council should have permanent 
and rotating members on the UN model, 
whether the UK as a non-EU member should 
be included, or which powers such a body 
should have. But the proposal underlines 
the striving for new formats, and highlights 
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how the more geostrategically orientated 
member states are looking for ways to 
institutionalise more flexible decision-
making in the CFSP. 
The question of how to achieve this 
needs to be considered in both a medium-
term and a long-term perspective. In the 
medium term flexible integration within 
and outside CFSP structures offers clear 
advantages over qualified majority voting. 
Legitimacy is given where only willing 
member states engage, for example in 
PESCO or in coalitions of the willing, and 
remain subject to control by their respec-
tive national parliaments. In this way the 
EU’s actions remain externally credible, 
as long as these groups are embedded in 
a unanimously adopted EU strategy and 
linked to the CFSP via the EU institutions 
(above all the European Council, the For-
eign Affairs Council and the High Repre-
sentative). There are good reasons to secure 
this flexible integration through a core 
group including Germany, France and, 
at least, Poland. Here, the effect of these 
measures should be to make the EU more 
effective. 
In the long term the EU should seek to 
develop a shared strategic culture. To this 
end the EEAS’s Intelligence and Situation 
Centre (EU INTCEN) could establish a Euro-
pean analysis capacity. This would have two 
advantages: collective threat assessments 
and intelligence reports would promote 
information exchange between member 
states’ security services and EU institutions. 
This would also promote a European culture 
of interest definition and decision-making, 
in the Foreign Affairs Council as well as the 
European Council. Taken together, these 
can contribute to a more coherent and thus 
more effective CFSP. 
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